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Abstract
The rise of market power in recent decades has received increased attention, but the de-
terminants of such a rise remain unclear. This paper studies whether and how increasing
import penetration of inputs leads to a more concentrated market structure and the associ-
ated rise of markups. The use of quadratic preferences in combination with the inclusion of
the firm’s choice to import create a link between the use of imported inputs and markups.
A reduction in importing costs induces non-importers to start importing intermediates.
Yet, the effect on profits is shaped by a trade-off between the potential marginal cost ad-
vantage and the fixed cost incurred from importing. As a result, only the most productive
firms benefit from globalization, while existing importing firms do not fully pass through
the reduction in trade costs using prices. The selection of importers, cost-savings from
imported inputs and industry firm turnover jointly explain the rise of average markups
in the market. Guided by this theoretical framework, we combine firm-level panel data,
sector-level trade data and input-output tables to present empirical evidence on the rela-
tionship between the increase in imported input penetration and the rise of market power
in the US over the last four decades. Using six-digit sectors as the unit of observation, we
show that imported input penetration is positively associated with the size of markups.
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We test the model predictions on both the import decisions of heterogeneous firms and its
implications for market structure. A difference-in-difference exercise that exploits China’s
accession to the WTO and the use of input tariffs as a proxy for imported input penetration
provide additional supporting evidence. Overall, we find that average industry markups
would have been around 1.4% lower each year in the absence of imported inputs.
Keywords: globalization, import penetration, markups
JEL Codes: F14, F15, L13
1 Introduction
Discussions about the rise of market power and its macroeconomic impacts prevail in the most
recent economic literature (Kwoka et al. 2015, Barkai 2016, Gutiérrez and Philippon 2016, Azar
et al. 2017, Ganapati 2017, Traina 2018). The particularly evident decline in the labor share
in the United States since 2000 is primarily attributed to the rise of ’superstar’ firms (Autor
et al. 2017). Firm-level evidence shows that average markup has increased sharply since 1980,
from 18% above marginal cost to 67% in 2014 (De Loecker and Eeckhout 2017). These studies
present the rise of concentration in the market over time and have led to heated policy debates.
However, the determinants of such an increase in market power remain unclear.
Importantly, another critical trend in the past several decades is globalization and the accom-
panied global sourcing. Dramatic removal of trade barriers and a substantial decrease of tariffs
as well as advances in communication, information, and transportation technologies have rev-
olutionized how and where firms source their input for production. Indeed, there has been
a substantial increase in industry openness and imports in the United States in the last few
decades: the ratio of imports to GDP went up from 4.2 percent in 1960 to around 16.5 percent
in 2014.1 How do firms use imported inputs in their production? How does the use of foreign
imports affect industry concentration? How are markups impacted by firms’ import decisions
and the change of market concentration?
Given the transformative impact of globalization, it is natural to consider the effect that import
penetration may have had on the market structure and on a firm’s decisions to set the markup.
The conventional wisdom underlines the intensified foreign competition as the process of glob-
alization continues, which thereby alleviates the distortions associated with monopoly power.
But, globalization also transforms the way firms in developed countries procure their inputs, al-
though the ability of firms to select into importing might be limited to only a few firms (Antras
et al. 2017). Despite the rapid expansion of global sourcing and widespread policy interest, the
existing literature in trade has so far mainly focused on exporting instead of importing and has
1IMF Databank, USA Imports of goods and services (% of GDP), url: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
2
paid relatively little attention to this facet of the interaction between imported input penetration
and market concentration.
This paper aims to contribute to our understanding of the relationship between trade openness
and market structure. On the one hand, import penetration increases competition from foreign
producers, which implies pressure for the firms to decrease their markup. On the other hand,
trade liberalization also leads to cost reduction due to improved access to imports of foreign
intermediate inputs. If trade liberalization benefits only the most productive firms in each
industry, the market concentration will rise as industries become increasingly dominated by
large firms with high profits and low shares of labor in firm value-added and sales. To study
these mechanisms, we provide a theoretical framework which relates the change in markup
to the change in the extensive margin of sourcing decisions. We then look at how change in
average markups is associated with imported input penetration in the process of globalization
over 40 years. We combine firm-level micro panel data, sector-level trade data, and input-
output tables and present empirical evidence on the relationship between the increasing trend
of imported inputs penetration and the rise of market power over the last four decades. At the
six-digit industry level, we find that the increase in imported input penetration is associated
with increased market concentration, implying that only the most productive firms benefit from
trade liberalization.
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we developed a simple theoretical model that links
market structure to global outsourcing. We extend Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) to include the
firm’s input procurement decision and highlight the firm’s choice on importing foreign input
in the spirit of Amiti et al. (2014), where the change of markup change with the extensive
margin of sourcing decisions. As we work with quadratic preferences with the inclusion of the
firm’s choice to import intermediate inputs, the model generates linear equations that relate
changes in the variable markup with changes in the imported input penetration. A reduction in
importing costs induces non-importers to start importing intermediates. Yet, the capability to
profit from importing foreign inputs depends on a firm’s trade-off between the potential marginal
cost advantage and the fixed cost incurred from importing. Since it requires a fixed cost of
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importing to select cost-efficient intermediate inputs, the capability to benefit from the reduction
of trade costs and to employ imported inputs into production depends on the level of productivity.
High-productivity firms that can pay the associated fixed cost and import intermediate inputs
will be thereby able to magnify their cost advantage relative to less productive firms.
Second, we illustrate some descriptive facts on rising import penetration and markups since 1970
before proceeding onto empirical analysis. We show that the ratio of imports to GDP went up
from 4.2% in 1960 to around 16.5% in 2014, while the average markup increased from around
1.2 to over 1.6 in the same period. Import penetration has an ambiguous relationship with
markup. Standard trade theory would predict reduced markup due to more imported output
competition. But, if the market is imperfectly competitive, a reduction in trade costs due to
globalization will have heterogeneous impacts on the markup of firms that import inputs and
firms that rely only on domestic input. Therefore we distinguish import penetration in output
and input and measure them separately. Indeed, when we look at imported input penetration,
we find a strong correlation between the rise of imported input penetration ratio at the level
of 2-digit sector weighted average markup based on firm-level sales, while the overall import
penetration ratio shows an ambiguous relationship with the change of markup. This is because
the import penetration ratio mixed the effect of competition from the final goods with the effect
of employment of cheaper/better inputs on market structure. Making use of imported inputs
contributes to the decrease in the firm’s marginal cost and increases the firm’s potential of higher
markup. But it may require some level of firm ability to take advantage of imported inputs.
Third, we present empirical evidence on the relationship between the rise of market power and
the increase in imported inputs penetration over the last four decades. We use firm-level panel
data that contain critical balance-sheet variables such as sales, the number of employees and
capital for production function estimation from WRDS-Compustat Database. By applying the
production-based approach (De Loecker et al. 2016), we estimate markups at firm level from 1972
to 2014. We then measure direct import penetration level from industry-level trade data from the
United States import and export Data of the Center for International Data, UN COMTRADE,
and USA Trade Online. Combining input-output benchmark table at the 6-digit industry level
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from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), we measure indirect intermediates import pene-
tration by weighting the direct import penetration ratio with the degree of interdependence of
each industry pair. We find that a 10% increase in the rise of imported input penetration is
associated with a 0.2% increase in market concentration, implying that only the most productive
firms benefit from trade liberalization. We further test our predictions of heterogeneous firms’
decisions on intermediates importing and the implications on the market structure using out-
put and input tariffs as proxies for import: a 10 percent increase of input penetration induces
roughly 1.2 percent increase of markup on average. This finding is robust to different model
specifications at both the firm and industry levels. It also survives from various concerns of the
model including alternative markup measure, alternative benchmark weighting in accounting for
input penetration, and the use of derived input tariff as a proxy for input penetration. We also
applied a difference-in-difference approach taking China’s accession into the WTO as a trade
shock to provide additional support to our main predictions.
This paper explores the mechanism that links the globalization process to the trend of rising
markups over the last four decades. The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, we
construct a theoretical model that links the rise of the input imports and the increase of average
markups, and also distinguishes the changes of the market structures during this process, i.e.,
the entry-exit decisions, outsourcing decisions, and price strategies made by heterogeneous firms.
Second, we provide empirical evidence that supports these predictions and the mechanisms
identified in theory. A difference-in-difference exercise that exploits China’s accession to the
WTO and the use of input tariffs as a proxy for imported input penetration provide additional
supporting evidence to the theory.
Our paper contributes to several strands of the literature. We add to the vibrant empirical
research that looks at the ambiguous effects of trade liberalization on markups (Burstein and
Gopinath 2014). There is empirical evidence of reduction of markups due to more competition
following dramatic trade liberalization for some countries. For example, Badinger (2007) finds
a decrease of markups in aggregate manufacturing sectors following the EU’s Single Market
Programme. Some literature discovers that trade liberalization of intermediates inputs may lead
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to markup increase due to various reasons. Ludema and Yu (2016) explain the incomplete pass-
through of foreign tariff reductions with firms’ quality-upgrading strategies, which are estimated
to be greater for high productivity firms. Amiti et al. (2014) develop an oligopoly framework
with variable markups and imported inputs, and find that firms with top import shares have
low exchange rate pass-through. Brandt et al. (2017) find that cuts in output tariffs reduce
markups while cuts in input tariffs raise both markups and productivity by examining China’s
WTO accession and the performance of Chinese manufacturing firms.2
These case studies focus on the impacts of striking shocks such as trade liberalizations for a
relatively short period. They link markup variation exclusively to a market share of the firm,
neglecting the effect that exogenous change of variable cost has on industry reallocation in the
long run. Instead, our paper looks at the impact on the industry that the broad process of
globalization brings over 40 years, which combines short-run effects of trade cost reduction on
marginal cost and competition with the impact on industry reallocation in the relative long
term.
Our theoretical framework is closely related to and is built upon Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and
Halpern et al. (2015). Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) develop a monopolistic competition model
of trade with firm heterogeneity which has been a workhorse model that predicts intra-industry
reallocation between firms with different mark-ups following trade liberalization. Halpern et al.
(2015) estimate the productivity gain from the improved access to foreign input. They assume a
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function and provide a static model of industry
equilibrium where firms use both domestic and imported intermediates goods for production.
However, CES utility directly implies constant markup and make it unsatisfactory to analyze
variable markup changes concerning aggregate shocks. We instead employ the linear demand
system as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and trace in detail how imported input penetration
plays a role in the pricing of firms that have better ability to utilize sourcing opportunities. If
firm heterogeneity interacts with fixed sourcing costs, the firm’s decision to import from one
2Other case studies include Fan et al. (2018) for China, De Loecker et al. (2016) for India, Altomonte and
Barattieri (2015) for Italy, Moreno and Rodríguez (2011) for Spain, Konings et al. (2005) for Bulgaria and
Romania and Harrison (1994) for Cote d’Ivoire.
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market will also affect market structure. In our model, a reduction in global sourcing costs
induces a firm to increase imports of low-cost input and to increase the markup. But the access
to foreign inputs is restricted to the firms that can pay the fixed importing cost and use imported
intermediates. Our model predicts that, as the cost of importing decreases, existing importing
firms will import more foreign intermediate varieties, leading to even better advantages in both
product quality and production cost. These two effects will magnify existing strengths that
more productive firms have relative to less productive firms. This, in turn, implies that trade
liberalization has asymmetric impacts on the market share of existing market players.
Our paper also relates to the literature that looks at the global trend of market power and its
consequences. De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018) document the rising trend of global market
power. While it is more salient in the developed world than in the emerging areas, the average
global markup increased from 1.1 to 1.6 between 1980 and 2016. For the U.S in particular,
the average mark-up has been increasing dramatically since the 1980s, and it is believed to be
associated with several other macroeconomic trends such as the decline in labor and capital
share, the decrease of low skill labor wage, and the slow down in aggregate output (De Loecker
and Eeckhout 2017). Autor et al. (2017) reassess the secular trend of labor share through micro
panel data since 1982 and interpret the fall in the labor share to be the result of the rise of
“superstar firms” that dominate the market with high profits and low share of labor in firm
value-added and sales. They also notice the potential role that globalization and technological
changes might have played but are skeptical as the fall in labor’s share also appears in non-
traded sectors like retail and wholesale, not just in traded industries like manufacturing. There
is other circumstantial evidence in this story of rising market power.3 A paper that is closely
related to ours is that of Elsby et al. (2013), who consider the potential impact consider the
possible effects of globalization and rising imports on the decline of labor share. They provide
a set of simple cross-industry regressions and graphs and show that the variation in the change
in import exposure explains 22 percent of the cross-industry variation in payroll-share changes.
3For example, increased profits (Barkai 2016), decreased investment(Gutiérrez and Philippon 2016), decreased
wages in concentrated markets (Azar et al. 2017), weakened antitrust enforcement (Kwoka et al. 2015), and
restricted output (Ganapati 2017).
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While these studies try to link the rise of market power of superstar firms as the cause for the
decline of labor share, our purpose is to propose a mechanism that drives this rising market
concentration and to illustrate how less-frictional international trade enables more efficient firms
to be rewarded with higher market shares today than in the past. Our paper looks not only
at the direct impact, i.e., the substitution effect, which depresses the labor share of domestic
income and reduces the marginal cost of firms that employ cheap foreign inputs, but also the
indirect impact, which changes the market structure to be more concentrated as only some firms
can pay the fixed cost and utilize global opportunities. We also provide direct empirical evidence
of these mechanisms.
Finally, our paper complements a large body of literature that evaluates welfare gains from
trade by estimating its impact on markup heterogeneity and allocative efficiency. Epifani and
Gancia (2011) document several stylized facts about markup dispersion across industries over
time and in a relationship with exposure to trade. They provide an oligopoly framework with
CES utility and find that markup heterogeneity entails significant costs and that asymmetric
trade liberalization may reduce welfare when there exists restricted entry. Feenstra and Wein-
stein (2017) consider symmetric translog preferences and structurally estimate the welfare gain
of globalization into variety-increase and markup-decline channels. There are two critical differ-
ences between the theoretical framework in these papers and the model we present here. First,
our paper adopts monopolistic competition with linear demand system which allows markup
variability to depend not only on market share but also on imported input substitution and
product/industry characteristics. Second, in our framework, a change in the trade costs in-
duces marginal cost change directly and induces price change indirectly through both general
equilibrium effects (the number of active firms) that shift or rotate the firm’s demand curve.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a general theoretical framework
that encompasses monopolistic competition and variable markup to examine the impact of trade
cost reductions on firms’ markups and associated intra-industry reallocation. Section 3 describes
the datasets and measurements used. Section 4 presents our econometric specifications and
report the main results, followed by an interpretation of the underlying mechanisms. Section 5
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provides a series of robustness checks. The last section concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we develop our theoretical framework of global sourcing and markup. Our model
is based on an extension of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). Building upon Halpern et al. (2015), we
incorporate Amiti et al. (2014)’s way to model the firm’s cost structure and its choice to import
intermediate inputs. We extend the model by relating the option of importing to productivity
and analyze its comparative statistics. In sections below, we present the model and derive
equilibrium prices, sourcing strategies, marginal cost, and markups. Since our model is similar
to Amiti et al. (2014), we relegate most of the derivations to the Appendix and examine here in
more detail the impact of increasing import penetration on markups.
2.1 Consumers
Preferences are defined over a continuum of differentiated varieties indexed by i ∈ Ω , and a
homogeneous good chose as numeraire. As in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), consumers share the
same quasi-linear utility function given by
U = qc0 + α
ˆ
i∈Ω
qcidi−
1
2γ
ˆ
i∈Ω
(qci )2di−
1
2η
(ˆ
qcidi
)2
(1)
where qc0 and qci represent the quantities of the numeraire good and the differentiated variety
i respectively. The demand parameters α, η, and γ are all positive. The parameters α and η
index the substitution pattern between the differentiated varieties and the numeraire good, and
the level of competition intensity among differentiated varieties. The parameter γ indexes the
decreasing rate of the marginal utility for each variety. Given the price for variety i , consumers
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decide their quantity demand as followings.
qi ≡ Lqci =
αL
ηN + γ −
L
γ
pi +
ηN
ηN + γ
L
γ
P¯ (2)
where L denotes the population of the economy, N measures the mass of varieties in Ω (which is
also the number of active firms) and P¯ = 1
N
´
i∈Ω∗ pidi is the average price of all varieties existing
in the market. The set Ω∗ is the collection of the varieties that exist in the market. In other
words, the variety which belongs to the set Ω∗ must satisfy
pi ≤ 1
ηN + γ (γα + ηNP¯ ) ≡ pmax (3)
This inequality suggests that all firms’ prices will be up-bounded by the price level charged by
the lowest productivity firm. This is because low-productivity firms need to charge relatively
high level of prices in order to cover their high variable cost. Among the surviving firms, the
demand is limited to the price that the lowest productivity firm charges.
2.2 Producers
For simplicity, we assume that final-good varieties are prohibitively costly to trade across bor-
ders. We do this in order to highlight the trade of intermediate input as the relevant mechanism.4
Similar to Amiti et al. (2014), we model the cost structure of the firm and its choice to im-
port intermediate inputs. Consider firm i, indexed by its productivity Ai, uses labor Zi and a
composite intermediate input Xi to produce output Yi according to the production function:
Yi = AiXiφZi1−φ (4)
4The model could be extended to accommodate trading of final goods and the extensive margins of both
exports and imports wil be jointly determined.
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The composite intermediate input Xi consists of two types of intermediate goods, one of which
could be purchased either locally or imported from the foreign market and the other one of
which could only be procured domestically. Di represents the quantity of the domestic-specific
input which can only be purchased domestically, and Mi represents the amount of intermediate
inputs which could be sourced from either the domestic or the foreign markets. Let ξ be the
elasticity of substitution between Di and Mi .
Xi =
[
D
ξ
1+ξ
i + aM
ξ
1+ξ
i
] 1+ξ
ξ
(5)
Intuitively, a measures the productivity advantage of the foreign variety. Although production
is still possible without the use of imported inputs, imported inputs are useful due to (i) their
potential productivity advantage a, and (ii) the love-of-variety feature of the production function.
The prices of imported inputs and domestic inputs are denoted by PM and PD respectively, and
we assume the firms are price takers in these input markets.
For each imported intermediate good, firm i must incur a fixed cost fi (Ai), which depends on
firm productivity Ai. Examples for the fixed importing costs include the information gathering
and search cost, management cost, cost for an import permit, and the production adjustment
for various inputs. We believe the high productivity firms pursue cost advantage in both the
production and importing processes. For example, the high productivity firms hire the high
productivity workers who will lower the management cost. They are more likely to export to
more markets and pursue widely international connections, which will lower the search cost.
In section 2.5, we relax the assumption on the dependence of the fixed cost while assuming
a complementary form of the production function. The main predictions of that model are
consistent with the one with the fixed cost endogenous to the productivity.
The presence of fixed costs have been founded empirically and have been widely assumed (Amiti
et al. 2014; Antras et al. (2017); Gopinath and Neiman (2014); Halpern et al. (2015)). Here we
further assume that the fixed sourcing cost a firm has to pay to start importing intermediate
inputs is decreasing with productivity. If we think of the fixed cost as the searching and informa-
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tion cost a firm pays to find the most cost-efficient external input supplier, then it is reasonable
to believe that high-productivity firms are likely to find the desired trading partner easier.5
Following this setting, we compute the variable cost index for importers and non-importers as
follows
Vi =

1 + ( τmPMf
a
) 11+ξ 1+ξ importer[
1 + (PMd)
1
1+ξ
]1+ξ
non− importer
(6)
where PMf and PMd are the prices for the foreign and domestic intermediates respectively; τm
captures the trade cost of purchasing the foreign intermediates.
The marginal cost of firm i is equal to:
ci = ςϕi
(
W
1− φ
)1−φ (
Vi
φ
)φ
= ςϕiV φi
−
D (7)
where W measures the domestic labor cost, thus
−
D ≡ ( W1−φ)1−φ( 1φ)φ is a common cost factor for
both importers and non-importers. ϕi is the inverse productivity of firm i, i.e. Ai = 1ςϕi , where
ς is a parameter. ϕi is assumed to follow a Pareto distribution, i.e. ϕ ∼
(
ϕ−ϕ
ϕ−ϕ
)k
with support[
ϕ, ϕ
]
. 6
Notice that the term
−
D is identical across all the firms. Moreover, firms only differ in their
productivity levels and the term Vi, depending on how much the foreign inputs they use.
In a closed economy, firm i only sources from the domestic market, so the profit maximization
problem is:
Maxpi pi
D = (pi − ci) ∗ qi
5Alternatively, this assumption could be replaced by a quantitative constrain on the relative scale of fixed
cost and net profit of being an importer. Moreover, we relax this assumption and consider a constant fixed cost
case in the following section 2.5.2.
6Recall that the productivity level for firm i is denoted as Ai, thus ςϕi = 1Ai .
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Profit maximization implies the following results:
piD = 12 (ci + cd)
µiD = (ci+cd)2ci
qiD = L(cd−ci)2γ
riD = L(cd−ci)(cd+ci)4γ
piiD = L(cd−ci)
2
4γ
(8)
where pi (cd) = pmax =12 (cmax + pmax), therefore, pmax = cd, and cd is the cut-off cost value for
the firms to be able to survive in the market with their exact variable cost, i.e, all the firms whose
variable cost is higher than this value will not be able to survive in the market. To simplify our
analysis, we assume the firms’ entry decision and the reveal of the productivity information take
place during the same period.
Assume the firm’s variable cost c is drawn from a known distribution G(c) with support [c, c].
7 The cost (productivity) cut-off is thus determined by the free-entry condition:
cdˆ
c
pi(ci)dG(c) = fE (9)
The mass of surviving firms is determined using cd and the zero demand price condition:
cd =
γα + ηNP¯
ηN + γ (10)
which implies
N = γ
η
α− cd
cd − P¯
(11)
and the mass of entrants
NE =
N
G(cd)
(12)
7Under the case of closed economy, the variable c follows the same type of distribution as the inverse pro-
ductivity.
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From which it follows
P¯ =
ˆ
ω∈Ω
p(ω)dω =
cdˆ
c
ci + cd
2 dG(ci)/G(cd) (13)
2.3 The Equilibrium
2.3.1 Determination of importing productivity cutoff
For simplicity, we keep the number of entrants NE and the productivity distribution G(.) fixed.
The number of survived firms is thusN = NEG (ϕd), where ϕd is the cut-off value of productivity,
i.e. cd = ςϕdV φi
−
D. Recall that the inverse productivity is assumed to be drawn from a Pareto
distribution, ϕ ∼
(
ϕ−ϕ
ϕ−ϕ
)k
with support
[
ϕ, ϕ
]
. Following Antras et al. (2017), we assume
that importing intermediate from the foreign market requires a fixed cost fm , whose value
is identical to all firms. Firm i decides whether to import the intermediates based on the
expected profits it faces. As we assume that the firm only imports one type of input from one
foreign country, the index V φi should be identical across all importing firms, i.e. V
φ
i = V φ. For
simplicity, we further define Ψ = Ψi ≡ ςV φi
−
D for importing firms (where
−
D ≡ ( W1−φ)1−φ( 1φ)φ)
and normalize ςV φi
−
D = 1 for all non-importing firms. The firm will import intermediates if
H(ϕi) ≡ pi(ϕi|importer)−pi(ϕi|non− importer) > fm, where pi(ϕi|importer) =
(
pfi − ϕiΨ
)
∗ qfi
with Ψ < 1 and pi(ϕi|non− importer) =
(
pdi − ϕi
)
∗ qdi .
This mechanism is presented in the illustrative Figure 1. The unit cost savings that importing
brings is constant. When a firm is the most productive (inverse productivity is 0), it can charge
highest price, sell most products and get highest profits. Importing foreign inputs brings no
change to its unit cost due to the cost structure, so to the price and quantity. Thus the profit
difference curve cross the origin. As a firm becomes less productive, it prices relatively lower, sell
less and profit decreases. But at the same time importing starts to bring in advantage because
it decrease unit cost by a certain amount, counteracting the decrease in productivity, and brings
positive profit difference. Until reaching a point where the negative effect that the decreases
in productivity brings on profit, exceeds the positive effects that the constant unit cost savings
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that importing brings on profits. And the profit difference curve starts to become downward
sloping.
Proposition 1. Given the highest inverse productivity of the survived firms in the market and
the following assumptions. (i) Importing fixed cost fm is identical to all firms, and (ii) the
fixed cost satisfies the conditions ϕ > 4γfm(1+Ψ)
L(1−Ψ) and ϕ <
2
1−Ψ
√
γfm
L
, then there exists an unique
solution ϕm which solves H(ϕm) = 0 in the definition range ϕm ∈
[
ϕ, ϕ
]
, and it follows that
H(ϕ) ≥ 0 for ϕ < ϕm and H(ϕ) < 0 for ϕ > ϕm.
Proposition 1 implies that only high productivity firms make importing, and the firms whose
inverse productivity is higher than a critical value, then they won’t make importing. Specifically,
this critic value is solved as:
ϕm =
ϕd +
√
ϕ2d − 4γfm(1+Ψ)L(1−Ψ)
1 + Ψ (14)
When the value of ϕm is less than ϕd, for the firms whose inverse productivity is lower than ϕm
will choose to import the inputs, and the firms with higher inverse productivity will choose to
use domestic inputs only. If ϕm ≥ ϕd, then all the firms in the market will not choose to import
the intermediate inputs.
2.3.2 Determination of the number of active firms and productivity cut-off
In the open economy case, equation (13) becomes:
P¯ =
ϕmˆ
ϕ
(
ϕΨ + ϕd
2
)
dG(ϕ)/G(ϕd) +
ϕdˆ
ϕm
(
ϕ+ ϕd
2
)
dG(ϕ)/G(ϕd) (15)
As ϕ ∼
(
ϕ−ϕ
ϕ−ϕ
)k
, we can simplify the equation above as:
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P¯ =
ϕmˆ
ϕ
k
(
ϕΨ + ϕd
2
)(
ϕ− ϕ
ϕd − ϕ
)k−1 (
1
ϕd − ϕ
)
dϕ+
ϕdˆ
ϕm
k
(
ϕ+ ϕd
2
)( ϕ− ϕ
ϕd − ϕ
)k−1 (
1
ϕd − ϕ
)
dϕ
(16)
The example with the uniform distribution function is solved as:
P¯ =
(
4
ϕd − ϕ
) [
3ϕ2d − (1−Ψ)ϕ2m −
(
Ψϕ+ 2ϕd
)
ϕ
]
(17)
Then the firm number is solved as:
N = γ
η
α− ϕd
ϕd −
(
4
ϕd−ϕ
) [
3ϕ2d − (1−Ψ)ϕ2m −
(
Ψϕ+ 2ϕd
)
ϕ
] (18)
Equation (18) shows that the number of survived firms N is negatively correlated with the cut-
off value ϕd. Recall from equation (12) that we have another relation between N and ϕd , i.e.
NE = NG(ϕd) , which indicates a positive relation between N and ϕd when the entrant mass NE is
fixed in short-run. Equations (12), (14), and (18) uniquely determine the inverse productivity
cut-off ϕd and firm number N , which is illustrated in Figure 3. The positive relation between N
and ϕd (equation (12)) represented by curve S suggests that the market will be able to support
more active firms when the productivity cut-off is low (high ϕd), while the negative relation
between N and ϕd (equation (18)) represented by curve D implies that only a limited number
of firms could survive in the market due to high choke price induced by low productivity cut-off
(high ϕd).
2.4 The Impact of Globalization
The process of globalization suggests a continuous reduction of trade costs between countries.
According to Equation (14), a reduction of variable trade cost will induce a lower price level
of intermediate input Ψ, making it more profitable for a firm to engage in intermediate input
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trading. Equation (14) shows that the inverse productivity cut-off to import foreign input ϕm will
be higher. This implies that there are more firms engage in importing cost-efficient intermediate
input. This is illustrated in Figure 2, where the expected profit curve moves outward when there
is a reduction in trade cost, leading to a higher inverse productivity cut-off value to become an
importing firm.
Equations (18) and (12) determine the equilibrium level of N and ϕd as shown in Figure 3.
It is clear that when the trade cost V φ decreases, the curve D1 shifts downwards while the S
curve remains unchanged. This is because the relation between N and ϕd in Equation (12) is
uncorrelated with trade cost this is is not the case for Equation (18). Solving the new equilibrium
gives a lower level of N and ϕd as shown in Figure 4. This indicates that the number of active
firms in the market shrinks following the reduction of trade costs. Moreover, a smaller ϕd
suggests that the productivity cut-off level to survive in the market also increases.
From simple differentiation of equations (14), (18) and (12) it follows that:8
Proposition 2. A decrease in variable trade cost τ induces the number of active firms in the
market N and the inverse productivity cut-off to survive ϕd to decrease, i.e.∂N∂Ψ > 0 and
∂ϕd
∂Ψ > 0;
furthermore, if the change of cut-off value is small enough, i.e. ∂ϕd
∂(1+Ψ)
1+Ψ
ϕd
< 1, in response to a
reduction of the trade cost τ the importing critical value ϕm will increase. 9
The average markup across all firms that survive is derived as:10
µ¯ =
ϕmˆ
ϕ
k
(
ϕΨ + ϕd
2ϕΨ
)(
ϕ− ϕ
ϕd − ϕ
)k−1 (
1
ϕd − ϕ
)
dϕ+
ϕdˆ
ϕm
k
(
ϕ+ ϕd
2ϕ
)(
ϕ− ϕ
ϕd − ϕ
)k−1 (
1
ϕd − ϕ
)
dϕ
(19)
An example with the uniform distribution is written as:
8The details of the derivation are presented in Appendix A2.
9The condition ∂ϕd∂Ψ <
4γκΨ+ϕdL(1−Ψ)2(1+Ψ)
L(1−Ψ)2(1+Ψ) is easy to satisfy if the value of Ψ is closed to one.
10The details of the derivation are presented in Appendix A3.
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µ¯ = ϕd
2
(
ϕd − ϕ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)

1
Ψ ln
ϕm
ϕ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)
+ ln ϕd
ϕm︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3)
−
1
2ϕ (20)
where k is the parameter for the distribution of inverse productivity; ϕd is the surviving cut-off
value of the inverse productivity; ϕm is the critical value of the inverse productivity to import;
and Ψ captures the variable cost of importing the inputs.
Combining the latter with equation (14), we observe that if ∂ϕd
∂(1+Ψ)
1+Ψ
ϕd
< 1 , then ∂ϕm
∂Ψ < 0,
which means that when importing cost decreases, more firms will use the imported inputs.
This condition also implies that the average markup µ¯ decreases in the importing cost Ψ, i.e,
∂µ¯
∂Ψ < 0. In other words, a lower importing intermediate price index leads to a higher average
markup. Specifically, based on the equation (20), we observe that the the link between trade
cost and average markup materializes via two different channels. First, there is a higher share
of high productivity firms. The first term of (20) captures the exit of low productivity firms
and then the sales reallocates to the high productivity firms with high markup. The second
term of (20) captures the fact that in response to a reduction of importing cost, the importing
firms will obtain higher markup, where lnϕm
ϕ
indexes the share of the importing firms out of all
survived firms. The third term measures the increase of market competition due to that the
importing firms charge a lower price in response to a reduction of input price. When the first
and second effects dominate the third effect, then the average markup will increase in response
to the reduction of importing cost.
Proposition 3. In response to a reduction of the trade cost, if the change of the surviving cut-off
value is small enough, i.e. ∂ϕd
∂Ψ
Ψ
ϕd
< lnϕ, the industry’s average markup µ¯ will increase. This is
due to the Cost Reduction Effect and the Reallocation Effect.
18
2.5 Extensions
This section completes our theoretical framework by altering a few dimensions of our modeling
setup and see how the results change. First, we allow the entry mass to be endogenously
determined by the free entry condition and discuss the conditions under which that our model
main predictions remain. Second, we turn the fixed sourcing costs that are previously increasing
in the firm’s inverse productivity into a constant independent one, and we show that the relevant
expressions would all be very similar. Third, to highlight the importance of importing, we have
assumed that final goods cannot be traded across borders. We relax this assumption and study
the joint determination of the extensive margins of both exports and imports.
2.5.1 Endogenous Number of Entrants
In the model so far we kept the entry mass NE constant. It could be endogenously determined
by the entry condition and supply of the entry firms, i.e.

´ ϕm
ϕ
L
−
D
2
(ϕd−Ψϕ)2
4γ dG(ϕ) +
´ ϕd
ϕm
L
−
D
2
(ϕd−ϕ)2
4γ dG(ϕ) = fE
N = NEG (ϕd)
(21)
Both equations together determine the supply side of the entry firms. From equation (14), we
know that ϕm is an increasing function of ϕd, given the value of Ψ. In this way, the value of
ϕd is determined by the entry cost fE and independent of the firm number N . In this case, the
curve which illustrates the supply side of the entry firms is drawn as a horizontal line in the
Figure 6 below (the curve S1). It is easy to prove that when the trade cost Ψ decreases, the
demand curve D1 shifts down to the position of the curve D2, and the supply curve S1 shifts
down to the position of the curve S2. In this case, the inverse productivity ϕd decreases but the
change in the cut-off value for the firm number N depend on the relative associated change of
both the supply and demand curve. Although we are not able to make quantitative statement
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on the changes of the importing critical value ϕm in this case, it is qualitatively clear that our
min prediction on average markup M¯ remains as long as the firm entry incurred by the rise of
imported input penetration remains in a relatively small scale over the observation period.
2.5.2 Independent Fixed Sourcing Cost
One might be concerned with the seemingly strong assumption that the fixed sourcing cost a
firm has to pay to start importing intermediate inputs is decreasing with productivity, though
it is well-justified by the fact that the searching and information cost it incurs to find the most
cost-efficient trading partner is likely to fall with productivity. To address this issue, we relax this
assumption and assume an independent fixed sourcing cost. We make the following assumptions
on the production function. It requires two types of inputs in the production, i.e., labor and
intermediate input. One unit of composite intermediate input can be transformed into φ units
of the final output. It requires at least 1
Ai
unites of labors to complete the transformation of one
unit of output, where the parameter Ai captures the labor productivity for the firm i .
Yi = min {AiLi, φXi} (22)
The marginal cost of firm i is computed as:
ci = ϕiW + φVi
where Vi and W are price for the intermediate input and wage of the labor respectively; ς and φ
are parameters with given values; and ϕi is inverse productivity of firm i, which is assumed to
follow a Pareto distribution, i.e. Ai = 1ςϕi and ϕ ∼
(
ϕ
ϕ
)k
with support [0, ϕ]. We can then prove
the following lemma:
Lemma 1. When the importing fixed cost is small enough, i.e. fm < (
Wϕd−φΨ+12 )
2Υ , there exists
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a ϕm ∈ [0, ϕd] which solves H(ϕm) = 0 ; and H(ϕ) ≥ 0 for ϕ < ϕm and H(ϕ) < 0 for ϕ > ϕm.
In this case, the survived firm who has lowest productivity won’t choose to import the interme-
diates.
Specifically, the critical value ϕm is given by:
ϕm =
1
W
[
Wϕd +
1−Ψ
2 −
2Υfm
L (1−Ψ)
]
(23)
According to Lemma 1 , the firms whose inverse productivity is lower than ϕm will choose to
import and the firms with higher inverse productivity will choose to use domestic inputs only.
Similar derivations give the average markup as:11
µ¯ =
ϕmˆ
0
[
Wϕ+ Ψ +Wϕd + 1
2 (Wϕ+ Ψ)
]
dG(ϕ)/G(ϕd) +
ϕdˆ
ϕm
[
Wϕ+ 2 +Wϕd
2 (Wϕ+ 1)
]
dG(ϕ)/G(ϕd) (24)
Assuming that the inverse productivity follows uniform distribution, i.e. k = 1 and ϕ¯ = 1, the
average markup across all firms that survive is derived as:
µ¯ = 12
1 +
Wϕd + 1Wϕd︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)
 ln
 Wϕm + ΨΨ (Wϕm + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)
+
(
Wϕd + 1
Wϕd
)
ln (Wϕd + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3)
 (25)
It follows that the average markup µ¯ increases in the importing critical value ϕm. Similar to
the results in the case of Cobb-Douglous productivity function, we observe two channels for the
rise of the average markup in reacting to the reduction of Ψ, i.e. the reallocation effect and cost
reduction effects. Term (1) of 25 captures the reallocation effect such that lowering importing
cost reduces the surviving cut-off ϕd, which increases the proportion of high productivity firms
11See Appendix A.5
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in the market. Term (2) reveals the fact that lower importing cost reduces the variable cost of
the importing firms directly, which enhances the competition capacity of these firms. Term (3)
increases in ϕd, which reveals that the firms that never import inputs will face higher intense
of market competition after the importing cost reduces, and thus their markups will be lower
than before. When the effects of terms (1) and (2) dominates the effect of term (3), the average
markup will increase in react to a reduction of the importing cost. As a result, a reduction
in variable trade costs increases the average markup due to these two effects. Next, we will
show that in response to a reduction of importing cost, the average markup will increase when
some conditions satisfy. Recall that from 10, the change of ϕd is very small in response to the
varying of importing cost when the parameter η is small enough. If we set η = 0, ϕd will be
constant in the importing cost Ψ. Given this property, when the importing cost Ψ decreases,
the importing critical value ϕm will increase according to 23. That means more firms will enter
the international input market. Given all these properties, we observe that, terms (1) and (2) of
25 are constant in Ψ while term (2) decreases in Ψ. In this case, we will observe an increase of
average markup in response to a reduction of importing cost Ψ. Actually, when the parameter
η is small enough (not necessary to be zero), the change of term (3) will be very small and the
average markup still decreases in Ψ .
3 Data and measurement
Our theoretical framework shows that a decrease in trade cost and the associated rise in input
import penetration is associated with a surge in the markup. It is due to both a cost reduction
and reallocation effect. The remainder of the paper aims to find empirical evidence that supports
this claim. To uncover the relationship between input import penetration and markups, we use
Compustat data of US public firms to generate markup, and we combine US trade data and
Input-Output tables to test the impacts of import penetration on markups. The empirical
exercise is based on three main types of data for the empirical analysis: firm’s balance-sheet
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data, trade data, and input-output tables at detailed commodity level.
3.1 Firm Balance-Sheet Data
We use Compustat (North America) Fundamental Annual database to derive firm-level balance
sheet information. Compustat has variables that are needed for production function estimation
including annual sales, wages, capital stock, as well as the labor of all the US publicly traded
firms available from 1950 to 2014 in Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). We restrict
the sample as follows: First, we only consider and identify firms incorporated in the United
States based on Stock Exchange Code (EXCH) and Foreign Incorporation Code (FIC); Second,
we exclude observations with obviously mis-measured variables of interests, such as negative
sales or employment. The final sample counts 504,319 firms-year observations covering the years
from 1972 to 2014. The common GDP deflator comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) tables of the United States. Therefore we obtain
firm-level markup by applying the so-called cost-based production approach as in De Loecker
and Warzynski (2012).
Constrained by the data availability of import penetration measures, we focus on the sample
from 1972 to 2014, that we match with industrial level import penetration ratios in the firm-
level regression. It reduces our sample to 412,565 firms-year observations with an average of
9,822 firm-level observations per year. Compustat assigns each firm a North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS) 2012 6-digit sector code based on the firm’s operation reported as
required by Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). The 2012 NAICS codes have 1,065
disaggregate industries. To match it with the industrial classification in the Input-Output table,
we first converted the different versions of NAICS codes to the 2007 version and then assigned
each 2007 NAICS code with one of the 389 6-digit IO industries used in the Input-Output table
from Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Table 2 shows the IO industrial distribution of the
firm-year observations at the most aggregate level between 1972 to 2014. While Compustat only
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includes publicly traded companies, our sample covers firms across most of the industries and
matches closely with the industrial distribution across the economy. A large portion of firms is
in the Manufacturing and Finance sector, accounting for 35.5% and 21.8% of the observations
respectively in the sample. We are interested in how imported inputs penetration is related to
markup at the firm level, but Compustat does not contain information on how much each firm
employ foreign inputs. Therefore in the industry-level regression, we compute the sales-weighted
markup at the 6-digit BEA I-O industry level to match with industry-level import penetration
measures.
3.2 Markup Estimation
Defined as the ratio of price over marginal cost, markups can be estimated by a few different
methods prevailing in the field of empirical industrial organization. As detailed data on price and
marginal cost data is usually unavailable, markup estimation depends on the granularity of the
available data and the choice of assumptions. On the one hand, the “demand-based” estimation
requires assumptions on the form of demand function and market structure, therefore marginal
cost and markups are estimated with the associated demand elasticity and firms’ optimal pricing
behavior as in Bresnahan (1982) and Berry et al. (1995). On the other hand, the “production-
based” method proposed in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) builds upon the insight of Hall
(1988) where markups are inferred by estimating the production function with assumptions
on the firms’ optimal input choice from total cost minimization. Markup is then derived as the
product of the input revenue share and output elasticity of any chosen variable input. Intuitively,
it is measured as technology-adjusted cost share. As the input cost shares are often available in
the accounting data, it is easy to estimate markup by having an estimate of the input elasticity.
The input elasticity is estimated using various production function estimation methods including
OLS, Olley-Pakes, and Levin-Petrin methods. And our baseline results are based on Olley-Pakes
method.
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We adopt the “production-based” method in our markup estimation for several reasons. First,
one of our model prediction is that imported input penetration is associated with rising markup
through the change of market structure. Therefore it is reasonable to impose as least assumptions
as we can on the market structure in markup estimation. Second, Compustat data is firm-level
balance sheet accounting data, from which input share is directly calculated. Last, following
the same method of markup estimation would make our results comparable to De Loecker et al.
(2016). As we are following the same manner, we relegate the necessary derivation of markup
in Appendix 6.
3.3 Trade Data
The trade data are used to compute direct import penetration measures. The data is divided
into three parts: 1972-1988; 1989-2006; and 2007-2014. The first two parts of data come from
U.S. trade data assembled by Feenstra (1996). For the period 1972 to 1988, the data are by
year at the level of 4-digit 1972-revision SIC industry and the level of 1987 SIC version for the
years from 1989 to 2006.12 The other part of trade data comes from USA Trade Online, which
contains data on US (down to district-level) export, import, and total trade value at various
industrial classification such as 10-digit HTS and 6-digit NAICS for different versions covering
from 2007-2014. USA Trade Online always starts using the new NAICS revision the year after
the change. So for 2008-2012, the data report the 2007 NAICS codes and for 2013-2017 the
2012 NAICS codes and so on. To match with other sources of data, we harmonized the different
industrial classifications and different versions based on the concordance table provided by the
Census Bureau and Bureau of Economic Analysis.
12There are 533 unique 4-digit SIC 1972 version industries appear in the 1972-1988 sample, converted to 507
NAICS 2007 industry codes. For 1989-2006 sample, there are 459 unique SIC 1987 version industries converted
to 456 NAICS 2007 industry codes.
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3.4 Input-Output Table
A crucial component of our empirical analysis is the derivation of a measure of import pene-
tration of intermediate products or vertical import penetration. To build this measure, we take
advantage of input-output tables that provide information on the level of interdependence and
input use between industries. All the industry and I-O data come from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce. The I-O tables along with industry eco-
nomic accounts provide detailed information on the interrelationships between producers and
users and the contribution to production across industries. The data are available at three
levels: sector (15 industry groups), summary (71 industry groups), and detail (389 industry
groups). To get the highest level of disaggregation, we make use of the I-O data at a detail
level that is available for each 5-year benchmark years between 1947-2007. We calculate the
weights measuring how much each industry’s production is relying on the products of another
sector by the use values shares of the industry pair appear in detail I-O use table in 1972 in the
baseline regression. For example, the weight djs represents the value share of the input used
by industry s from industry j of the total inputs utilized by industry s in the benchmark year,
i.e., djs = usejs∑
j∈s usejs
. To keep the potential impact of the change of relative input use between
different industry due to the shift in trade policy to the minimum, we keep using the year 1997
as the baseline for the calculation of such weights.13
3.5 Measures of import penetration
This section describes how our main import penetration variables are constructed. We look at
the impact of import penetration both directly and indirectly. Horizontal import penetration
measures the direct effect of imported product and within-sector competition. By contrast,
13We assume that the input mix remains unchanged over the entire sample period, so ideally we need to
use the earliest available benchmark year, 1972. However, there are admittedly significant structural change of
industries due to technology and innovation in the 42 years our sample covers. To avoid potential bias caused by
the change of industrial classifications, we use year 1997 in the middle of our sample period to be the benchmark
year. We also proceed manual industry classfication mapping between years and use the weights calculated from
1972 benchmark I-O table to corroborate our main results in section 6.
26
vertical import penetration takes the interdependence and input use between sectors into con-
sideration. Horizontal and vertical import penetration is measured for the period 1974–2014 and
each of the 389 benchmark I-O industries based on the 1997 benchmark I-O table classification.
The horizontal import penetration (HIMP) for industry s in year t is calculated as:
himpst =
impst
impst + prodst − expst
where impst is the value of imports from the world to US in industry s at time t, and prodst is
the production value of industry s in year t.
Similar to the way of separating input tariffs from output tariffs in Amiti and Konings (2007),
we measure the cumulative impact of foreign input penetration in the industry s that is supplied
by sector j by defining a measure of vertical import penetration ratio (VIMP). We define this
for industry s as the weighted average of the import penetration of its inputs:
vimpst =
∑
j∈s
djshimpjt
where himpjt is the horizontal import penetration of intermediate inputs coming from industry
j whose goods are used as inputs in the production processes of industry s. The weights djs are
computed as described in section 4.3 from the I-O tables as discussed above.
Horizontal and vertical import penetrations have a different impact on both firms’ marginal
costs and markup. On the one hand, higher horizontal import penetration leads domestic firms
to face tougher final goods competition directly. This implies that an increase in horizontal
import penetration leads domestic firms to lower their production and prices, and thus reduce
their markup, assuming constant marginal costs. On the other hand, higher vertical import
penetration will not affect the competitive environment faced by domestic firms, but it leads to
a reduction in firms’ marginal costs and thus allowing more room for firms to raise markups.
Table 1 summarizes the features of our key variables, i.e., markup, horizontal and vertical
importing penetration rates for the industry level 1972-2014. Figure 8 provide our measure
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of vertical import penetration with average industry markup between 1974 to 2014.
4 Results
In this section, we test the main predictions of our theoretical model: vertical import penetration
is positively associated with average markups across industries and over time. We estimate our
baseline specification at the industry level and firm level respectively for a full combined sample
from 1972 to 2014.
4.1 Import penetration and markups: baseline results
We start by presenting how average markup increase with import penetration across the US
economy in the last four decades. Figure 7 reports the time evolution of import exposure along
with the sales-weighted markup. Measured as the value of imports of goods and services to
GDP, the import exposure ratio has been steadily increasing in the first and half decade (1960s-
1970s) despite the slightly drop of markup in the same period. Following the sharp increase in
import exposure since 1970, the markup has been increasing since the next decade (1980s) till
the present. As noted by De Loecker et al. (2016), there has been a sharp rise from a markup of
around 1.2 in 1980 to a markup of 1.6 in 2014, while the import exposure ratio has doubled in
the same period: it increase from around 10% in 1980 to 20% in 2014. This figure suggests that
import exposure may have changed markup in some ways other than only output competition.
In Figure 8, we report the VIMP ratio calculated as described in Section 3.5 with average markup
from 1974 to 2014.14Recall that this VIMP ratio is the average of direct import penetration ratio
in each industry (HIMP), weighted by the ratio of how each industry uses the other industry’s
output in the production. The VIMP ratio thus indicates the import penetration ratio of input.
Remarkably, the pattern of VIMP is very much aligned with the average markup since 1970s: it
14We would like to extend this to years before 1974 but we are constrained by trade data availability.
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increased form 0.05 to around 0.2 to 2014. These figures provide suggestive evidence consistent
with predictions in the theoretical model. Next, we show the empirical test of these conjectures.
4.1.1 Sector-Level Analysis
With the import penetrations and industry level markup measures in hand, we can implement
the following regression specification.
lnµst = β1lnHIMPst−1 + β2lnV IMPst−1 +X′stγ + σs + δt + εst (26)
where lnµst is the log of estimated average markup in the 6-digit US Input-Output industry s
weighted by sales in year t. lnHIMPst−1 and lnV IMPst−1 are the horizontal and vertical import
penetration ratios in the same sector s. They are lagged for one period to accommodate the time
it takes to adjust markups accordingly as described in the model and they also serve to attenuate
potential simultaneous bias between import penetration and markup. Xst is a vector of industry-
level control including industrial level capital intensity (KL) and average wage (WAGE), who
serve to capture the factors that could also potentially influence average markups. σs and δt are
industry and time fixed effects, respectively, to control for time-invariant industry-related effect
and time effect. εst is an iid error term. We clustered the standard errors at the industry level in
our following regressions to accommodate non-independent residuals across observations within
industries. Based on our theoretical framework, we expect β2 to be significant and positive.
Table 4 reports the baseline regression results. Results from the unweighted from the unweighted
sample in column (1) and (2) shows that an increase in one-year lagged vertical import penetra-
tion is associated with increase in markup, while horizontal import penetration negatively affects
sale-weighted industry markup. In terms of magnitude, a 10% increase in lagged vertical import
penetration is associated with a 0.43% increase in markup. Adding industry-level controls has
little impact on the significance and size of the estimated beta, equal to 0.40% in column (2).
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4.1.2 Firm-Level Analysis
In column (3) and (4), we implement a weighted regression specification having as weight the
number of observations in each 6-digit BEA Input-Output industry that are used in the esti-
mation of production function in each 2-digit sector. And this magnitude stays stable for these
weighted regressions in columns (3) and (4): the coefficient of vertical import penetration in-
creases to 1.23 and remains unchanged when including controls.We test our primary hypothesis
further using firm-level observations. In particular, we regress firm-level markups over 6-digit
industrial import penetration rations as in Acemoglu et al. (2016) and Olper et al. (2017),15
lnµist = β1lnHIMPst−1 + β2lnV IMPst−1 + Z′istγ + β4Ist + θi + σs + δt + εst (27)
where lnµist is the markup of the firm i, who operates in industry s at year t in equation 27. The
firm characteristic vector Fit is added to account for time-variant firm-level factors including the
number of employment, capital-labor ratio, and productivity that could also influence a firm’s
capacity of adjusting markups. We also include firm fixed-effects as captured by θi.
Table 5 reports the results from the firm level regressions. We find a positive and strongly
significant correlation between both types of penetration ratios and the value of markup. Ac-
cording to the results from the unweighted regression specification estimation, implies that a
10% increase of vertical import penetration contributes to .62% and .25% increase of firm-level
markup without and with other firm and industry controls. Columns (3) and (4) in Table 5
further reports the firm-level baseline results of weighted regression. Our results show a more
significant positive correlation between the vertical import penetration ratio and the markup
and they increase in scale comparing to unweighted regressions in column (1) and (2).
15In these regressions, we still use the industrial level data for the variables horizontal and vertical penetration
ratios due to the lacking of firm level data for these variables.
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4.2 Mechanisms
Here we further verify the main results presented above by looking into the specific mechanisms
that operate in our theoretical model.
4.2.1 Production Frontier
Our model predicts that firms are motivated to employ more foreign inputs when variable sourc-
ing cost decreases, but only firms with relatively high initial productivity can pay the fixed sourc-
ing costs, import foreign intermediate goods and obtain the corresponding market advantage.
Therefore, we should be able to observe that the positive effect of vertical import penetration is
more substantial for firms that are initially at the fringe of the productivity frontier. We interact
vertical import penetration ratio with a measure of the firm’s position relative to the produc-
tion frontier. We define a firm’s proximity to the frontier as the ratio of its initial estimated
productivity λiniit to the highest productivity of that year in the industry the firm belongs to as
in Amiti and Khandelwal (2013): PFit = λ
ini
it
maxi∈s(λiniit ) . Table 6 column (1) shows a significant
positive effect of the vertical import penetration ratio to markup and the significant positive
coefficient of the interaction term between vertical import penetration and production frontier
measure indicates the impact is more profound for firms initially at the fringe of productivity
frontier. This relationship remains stable with the addition of firm and industry level controls
as shown in column (2).
4.2.2 Industry Concentration
To fully understand the impacts of vertical import penetration on domestic market structure, we
use HHI index as a measure of market concentration and look at how vertical import penetration
may contribute to the reshaping of market structure. Table 6 shows a positive effect of the
vertical import penetration ratio but a negative effect of the horizontal import penetration
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intensity on the market concentration. The reports from Table 6 column (3) and (4) indicate
that when the high productivity firms use more ratio of foreign inputs, the low productivity firms
will face higher competition pressure from the high productivity firms and the market exiting
ratio rises as well.
4.2.3 Industry Exit ratio
The rest of Table 6 relates the percentage of firms’ exit in each industry with the import penetra-
tion measures. The central prediction on the relationship between vertical import penetration
and markup relies on the differential impacts that import penetration has on heterogeneous
firms. We thus expect to observe more firms exiting the market as high productivity firms re-
tain cost advantage through importing intermediate inputs. The positive coefficients of vertical
import penetration on industry exit ratio reported in Table 6 column (5) and (6) indicate that
when the high productivity firms use more foreign inputs, the low productivity firms will face
higher competition pressure from the high productivity firms and the market exiting ratio thus
rises.
To sum up our results, we test the predicted mechanism of our model: the effect on markup is
more profound for firms initially at the fringe of the productivity frontier. This is expected in
the model as only firms with relatively high productivity could pay the fixed cost of sourcing
intermediate goods from foreign countries and benefit more in the process of globalization. After
this, we look at the change of both HHI and firms’ exit ratio of each industry concerning the
shift of import penetration. They further validate our expectation: the industry’s sales are more
concentrated to the advantageous firms, and the low productivity firms are forced to exit the
market and so the firms’ exit ratio of the industry increases.
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5 Robustness Checks
5.1 Alternative Weighting
As described in Section 4, the measure of VIMP is a weighted average of the HIMP. In the
measure of VIMP above, the weights being used are the shares of use values of each industry
pair appear in detail input-output table in 1972. One possible concern is that these weights
are based on a far distant year to cover the entire sample. It is likely that the structure of the
economy has changed structurally and thus the initial industry classification and the associated
weights cannot account for these structural changes. Moreover, the use of weights derived from
1972 benchmark input-output table requires re-classifications of secondary products definitions
used in I-O tables over different benchmark years. Furthermore, I-O tables from 1972 to 1992 are
based on the SIC classification while they are based on NAICS for later years. The concordance
between SIC and NAICS as well as the concordance within different versions of each classification
are thus unavoidable. To address these issues, we hereby first construct VIMP using use value
shares from 1972 I-O table. We then split the sample into two parts, 1972-1988 and 1989-2014,
and assign different weights for each sample. We employ the use value shares from 1972 I-O
table and that from 1997 I-O table for these two split sample respectively.
The results are reported in Table 7. Our baseline results still hold for the entire sample using
weights from 1997 I-O table as in column (1). The VIMP turns out to be insignificant in the first
split 1972-1988 sample, but the results hold for the sample of 1989-2014 using weights from 1992
I-O table. This could be well explained by the fact that the observed sharp increase of markup
only started in the late 1980s and the impact of VIMP is more significant when large developing
economies like China just joined WTO and actively participated in the global value chain in
1990s. Also, the magnitude remains comparable with baseline regressions: a 10% increase in
lagged vertical import penetration contributes to the rise in markup by .07%.
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5.2 Output and Input Tariff
Presumably, the input and output tariff will determine the profitability of importing one product
and thus influence the magnitude of trade flow. In this subsection, we circumvent the measure-
ment issues of VIMP as described in the previous sections by using output tariff as a proxy
for HIMP and derive input tariff the same way as deriving VIMP. The data for output tariffs
are drawn from WTO trade analysis and information system (TRAINS) combined with tariffs
collected by Feenstra et al. (2002). Moreover, the tariff measures are based on SIC which is
consistent with 1972 I-O table and makes it more reliable when calculating input tariff using
the use value share derived as weights from I-O table. The measure to compute input tariffs are
adapted from the approach to measuring VIMP as in section 4:
τ inst =
∑
j∈s
djsτ
out
jt
where the input tariff of industry s, τ inst , is calculated as the weighted average of de jure output
tariffs τ outjt in any industry k at time t. Similar to the measure of VIMP, djs remains the use
value shares of industry j to the production of industry s as in section 4.4. A small difference,
however, is that the input tariffs are calculated at 4-digit SIC codes, and the use value shares
are concorded using the concordance table between I-O table and SIC provided in the 1972
benchmark I-O table. Next, we replace HIMP and VIMP with output tariff and input tariff in
our baseline regressions (26) and (27).
The results are displayed in columns (1) - (3) in Table 9. We still find a negative relationship
between input tariff and markup, suggesting that lowering input tariff leads to rising markup. To
get a sense of the magnitude, a 10% increase in lagged vertical import penetration contributes to
the rise of markup by .17% and a markup increase by .57% and .41% when we split the sample at
1997. Compared with the baseline results using HIMP and VIMP directly as in section 5.1, the
estimation results using output and input tariffs have larger coefficients for their impacts on the
markup in scale, yet still confirming the same relationship that our theoretical model predicts:
the increase of intermediate inputs penetration contributes positively to the rise of markup in
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the long run.
5.3 A Difference-in-Difference Exercise: China’s WTO Accession
In Section 4.1, we presented evidence showing the association between import penetration and
markup. Here, we are able to exploit a specific exogenous policy that changes import penetration
to address the potential issue of endogeneity. As China entered WTO in 2001, the trade between
the US and China has experienced impressive growth (Autor et al. 2018). We adopt a Difference-
in-Difference approach based on the China’s accession into WTO in 2001, which eliminated both
fixed trade barriers and variable trade costs. A number of researchers have considered this so-
called ’China Shock’ and have examined its impacts on the US economy in various aspects (Dorn
et al. 2016, Acemoglu et al. 2016, Autor et al. 2018, 2016). We consider a sample of industry-
level import penetration from China between 1997 to 2006 and begin with a specification in the
spirit of Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) as follows,
µst = β1AVHs98−00 ∗POST2000 + β2AV V s98−00 ∗POST2000 +X ′stΓ + σs + δt + σs× t+ εst (28)
The measures of import penetrations are similar to above but here we consider only tariff with
China. AVHs98−00 and AV Vs98−00, are the average output and input tariff with China in each
industry respectively, taking the averages of the three years prior to the accession. These mea-
sures are interacted with post dummy, POST2000, a dummy variable equal to 1 in each year after
2001. AndXst is a matrix industry-level control variables to controls for industry size (as the
natural logarithm of sales, employment and capital) and the endogeneity of import penetration
through interactions of industry fixed effects with a time dummy. Standard errors are clustered
at the industry level. Identification in the model thus comes from comparing the average markup
of each industry that has different levels of initial tariffs before this China shock in 2001. We
are interested in the question that if industries with relatively low levels in initial tariffs changed
markup differently after WTO than industries facing high initial levels of tariffs.
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Table 12 reports the results of the effect of tariff reduction due to China’s WTO accession and
the impacts on average markups. In the baseline regression results as shown in the Column
(1), we find statistically significant coefficients on the two interaction terms. As expected, the
negative coefficient of AVHs98−00∗POSTt suggests that industries with higher output tariff prior
to 2001 decreased average markup more the period as they faced greater competition due to this
China Shock. The positive coefficient of AV Vs98−00 ∗POSTt indicates that industries with lower
vertical import penetration levels prior to 2001 increase average markup more over the period
as they have improved access to input and concentrated market structure due to China’s WTO
accession in 2001. Column (2) and (3) extend the baseline regression with industry size controls
and industry trend interaction respectively. The results remains consistent with the baseline
results. As a placebo test, in Column (4) we replace the post dummy variable with the fake year
1999 and recalculating the average tariffs before the fake shock using year 1997 and 1998. The
coefficients of the two interaction terms turn to be insignificant.
5.4 Alternative Markup Measure and Sensitivity
The estimation of firm-level markup described in Section 3.2 relies on strict assumptions on the
production function such as perfect competition in input markets and constant output elasticity
over time. We here adopt an alternative measure of markup. We use economic profits over
sales as an indicator for price-cost margin directly and perform the same regression as in section
5.1 to see how the ratio of imports penetration is correlated with the firm’s profitability. This
approach enables us to circumvent potential measurement error in markup estimation. The
results from Table 10 with firm-level panel data show the same results: The coefficients of
industry level vertical import penetration ratio remain positive and significant, indicating that
higher exposure to intermediate import penetration is associated with higher price-cost margins.
In addition, the magnitude of the coefficients is close to results obtained before.
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6 Conclusion
The value of imports to annual GDP in the US went up from 4.2 percent to around 16.5 percent
from 1960 to 2014. The rapid increase in US exposure to trade over this period indicates that
both foreign competition and input penetration may have grown considerably relative to earlier
decades. Much previous research has studied the effects of imports on firm strategies after
dramatic removal of trade barriers in specific periods of time. But the question of how and
to what degree is increasing import penetration contributes to the more concentrated market
structure and the associated rise of markups remain unclear. By analyzing heterogeneous firms
that respond differently to the reduction of trade costs according to the initial productivity
within each industry, our paper extends the analysis of the consequences of trade liberalization
beyond change in export participation and average productivity . Specifically, we relate changes
in market structure with firms’ sourcing decisions and we relate average markups across US
industries to the changes in imported input exposure.
In our analysis, we propose and test this relationship. First, we construct a theoretical framework
to explicitly flesh out how vertical import penetration impacts the market concentration and the
firms’ markups. We obtain the following main predictions: increased input import penetration
is associated with (i) higher average markups; (ii) higher market concentration; and (iii) higher
exiting ratio at the industrial level. Second, we test these predictions and find empirical evidence
that supports them. Our research contributes to and improves on the existing literature along
two dimensions: First, we look at the structural impact on industry that the broad process of
globalization brings over 40 years, which will not only nest the short-run effects of trade cost
reduction on marginal cost and competition but also on industry reallocation in the relatively
long-term. Second, we trace in detail how imported input penetration plays a role in the pricing
of firms who have a better ability to utilize sourcing opportunities.
This paper does not incorporate the decisions in the boundaries firms such as outsourcing to
contracting firms and offshoring to foreign countries. Quantifying the combinatorial effects on
markups of these factors both theoretically and empirically is an essential avenue for further
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research. The consequences of import penetration for market power may contribute to public
ambivalence toward globalization and specific anxiety about resources redistribution between
workers, consumers and owners of firms.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variables N Mean Min Max
MarkupOLS 384,069 1.476711 .0017906 5.767589
MarkupOP 384,069 1.438996 .0017449 5.620286
MarkupACF 348,026 1.757911 .0021316 6.865868
Horizontal Import Penetration Ratio 15,990 .1100257 0 1
Vertical Import Penetration Ratio 15,990 .1910009 1.22e-06 5.586
Notes: The table reports the summary statistics for the main independent and dependent variables used
throughout the empirical analysis. The unit of observation for Markups is the production unit in the sector
under investigation in each day from 1972 to 2014. MarkupOLS , MarkupOP , and MarkupACF are estimated
firm-level markups by OLS regression, by Olley and Pakes (1996) Method, and by Ackerberg et al. (2015)
corrections respectively. Horizontal and Vertical Import Pentration Ratio are calculated by the methods
described in Sectoin 4 using weights from 1972 BEA I-O benchmark table.
Table 2: Sample Firm Distribution by Broad Industry
IO Code IO Description Firms(%) Freq(%)
11 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting 1,513 0.4
7 Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services 10,132 2.5
23 Construction 5,824 1.4
6 Educational services, health care, and social assistance 6,924 1.7
FIRE Finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing 89,734 21.8
51 Information 35,155 8.5
31G Manufacturing 146,914 35.6
21 Mining 32,971 8
81 Other services, except government 1,624 0.4
PROF Professional and business services 21,838 5.3
44RT Retail trade 17,374 4.2
48TW Transportation and warehousing 10,572 2.6
22 Utilities 18,015 4.4
42 Wholesale trade 13,941 3.4
Total 412,565 100
Notes: The table reports the industry distributions for the firms in the firm-level data from Compustats from 1972-2014. The IO
Code is based on BEA industry classification at sector level.
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Table 3: Change of Import Penetration Ratios in Manufacturing Sectors: 1980-2014
Industry Code Industry Description ∆HIMP ∆VIMP
311FT Wood products -0.032 0.035
313TT Nonmetallic mineral products 0.259 0.086
315AL Primary metals 0.556 0.154
321 Fabricated metal products -0.182 0.031
322 Machinery 0.189 -0.035
323 Computer and electronic products 0.197 -0.015
324 Electrical equipment, appliances, and components -0.131 0.05
325 Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts -0.835 -0.402
326 Other transportation equipment 0.687 0.014
327 Furniture and related products 0.146 -0.002
331 Miscellaneous manufacturing 0.436 0.279
332 Food and beverage and tobacco products 0.049 0.05
333 Textile mills and textile product mills 0.08 0.095
334 Apparel and leather and allied products -3.219 0.542
335 Paper products 0.399 0.093
3361MV Printing and related support activities -0.314 -0.136
3364OT Petroleum and coal products -0.156 0.067
337 Chemical products 0.021 -0.004
339 Plastics and rubber products 0.564 -0.007
Notes: The table reports the change of calculated horizontal and vertical import penetration ratios for manufacturing sectors at
BEA industry classification summary level, 1980-2014, taking 1997 Input Output table as benchmark.
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Table 4: Import Penetration and Markup: Baseline Industry Regression
Industry-level Markup
Panel A: Unweighted Regression Panel B: Weighted Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnHimpt−1 -0.326∗∗ -0.316∗∗ -0.308 -0.356∗∗
(0.158) (0.156) (0.686) (0.178)
lnVimpt−1 0.044∗ 0.039∗ 0.123∗ 0.117∗
(0.024) (0.022) (0.065) (0.061)
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Other Firm-level controls NO YES NO YES
Industries 356 356 356 356
Observations 12,336 12,280 12,264 12,208
R-squared 0.638 0.655 0.804 0.813
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The robust standard errors are corrected
by clustering variables at the 6-digit industry level. Sample is restricted to the 6-digit I-O benchmark industries during 1972-
2014. Dependent variable is industry-level markup estimations corrected by Olley-Pakes Method. lnHimpt−1 is 1-year lagged
industry horizontal import penetration ratio in log form. lnVimpt−1 is 1-year lagged industry vertical import penetration ratio
in log form. Specifications (1) - (2) report unweighted regressions and specifications (3) - (4) report the regression results that
uses the number of firms that arebeing used in the production function estimation of each 2-digit industry as weight in the
regressions. Other industry-level controls include industry capital-labor ratio.
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Table 5: Import Penetration and Markup: Baseline Firm Regression
Firm-level Markup
Panel A: Unweighted Regression Panel B: Weighted Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnHimpt−1 0.066 0.276∗∗∗ -0.565∗∗∗ 0.715∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.067) (0.150) (0.134)
lnVimpt−1 0.062∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.016)
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Other Industry-level controls NO YES NO YES
Other Firm-level controls NO YES NO YES
Firms 27,445 24,146 27,387 24,093
Observations 286,884 236,095 284,885 234,267
R-squared 0.681 0.717 0.706 0.747
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The robust standard errors are corrected by
clustering variables at the firm level. Sample is restricted to the firms that appears during 1972-2014 merged with 6-digit industry
code. Dependent variable is firm-level markup estimations corrected by Olley-Pakes Method. lnHimpt−1 is 1-year lagged industry
horizontal import penetration ratio in log form and lnVimpt−1 is 1-year lagged industry vertical import penetration ratio in log
form. Specifications (1) - (2) report unweighted regressions and specifications (3) - (4) report the regression results that uses the
number of firms that are being used in the production function estimation of each 2-digit industry as weight in the regressions.
Other firm-level controls include the number of employees, and capital-labor ratio. Other industry-level controls include industry
capital-labor ratio.
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Table 6: Mechanism: Production Frontier, HHI, Exit Ratio
Dependent Variables
Firm-level Markup Herfindahl Index Exit Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnHimpt−1 -0.928*** -0.795*** -0.033 0.005 0.166 -1.321∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.048) (0.044) (0.046) (0.290) (0.327)
lnVimpt−1 0.255*** 0.214*** 0.019∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.007) (0.009) (0.053) (0.057)
PF*Vimpt−1 0.005* 0.016***
(0.002) (0.009)
PF 0.0006*** 0.0008***
(0.000) (0.000)
Industry FE NO NO YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Other controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 283,197 217,168 12,336 12,280 11,654 11,593
R-squared 0.681 0.689 0.854 0.861 0.536 0.549
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables are in logs. Sample is restricted
to the firms that appears during 1972-2014 merged with 6-digit industry code. Dependent variables are: firm-level markup
estimations corrected by Olley-Pakes Method in column (1)-(2); 6-digit industry Herfindahl Index in column (3)-(4); and Firm
Exit Ratio calculated by the number of firms that appeared in last year but disappear in current year divided by total number of
firms in the last year at 6-digit industry level. lnHimpt−1 is 1-year lagged industry horizontal import penetration ratio in log form
and lnVimpt−1 is 1-year lagged industry vertical import penetration ratio in log form. PF is the variable that indicates a firm’s
initial distance to the productivity frontier within its main industry. PF equal to 1 if it is the top productivity firm at its initial
year in its main industry. Other firm-level controls include the number of employees and capital-labor ratio. Otherindustry-level
controls include industry capital-labor ratio and the Herfindahl index.
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Table 7: Robustness: Using Different Benckmark Weighting: Industry Level
Industry-level Markup
A: Pooling Sample B: Sample I C: Sample II
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnHimpt−1 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010
(0.014) (0.006) (0.022) (0.011)
lnVimpt−1 0.004 0.002 0.013 0.014*
(0.009) (0.003) (0.016) (0.007)
Other Industry-level controls NO YES NO NO
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 15,406 12,938 3073 12,332
R-squared 0.766 0.673 0.927 0.744
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The robust standard errors are corrected by
clustering variables at the 6-digit industry level. Sample is restricted to the detail level industries during 1972-2014. Dependent
variable is industry-level markup estimations corrected by Olley-Pakes Method. lnHimpt−1 is 1-year lagged industry horizontal
import penetration ratio in log form and lnVimpt−1 is 1-year lagged industry vertical import penetration ratio in log form.
Specifications (1) - (2) report regressions results on the full sample from 1972-2014 where VIMP is calculated using weights based
on 1997 benchmark I-O table. Column (3) - (4) report the regression results from splited samples of 1972-1982 and 1983 - 2014, and
VIMP is calculated using weights based on 1997 benchmark I-O table. Other industry-level controls include industry capital-labor
ratio.
Table 8: Robustness: Using Different Benchmark Weighting - Firm Level
Firm-level Markup
A: Pooling Sample B: Sample I C: Sample II
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnHimpt−1 -0.253∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗ 0.086 -0.012∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.060) (0.062) (0.004)
lnVimpt−1 0.011 0.018∗∗ 0.001 0.006∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.001)
Other Industry-level controls NO YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 296,791 245,083 139,902 110,153
R-squared 0.679 0.716 0.733 0.780
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The robust standard errors are corrected by
clustering variables at the 6-digit industry level. Sample is restricted to the detail level industries during 1972-2014. Dependent
variable is industry-level markup estimations corrected by Olley-Pakes Method. lnHimpt−1 is 1-year lagged industry horizontal import
penetration ratio in log form and lnVimpt−1 is 1-year lagged industry vertical import penetration ratio in log form. Specifications (1)
- (2) report regressions results on the full sample from 1972-2014 where VIMP is calculated using weights based on 1997 benchmark
I-O table. Column (3) - (4) report the regression results from splited samples of 1972-1988 and 1989 - 2014. Other industry-level
controls include industry capital-labor ratio.
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Table 9: Robustness: Input Tariff
Industry-level Markup
A: 1972
Weight
B: 1972
Weight
C: 1997
Weight
(1) (2) (3)
Output Tarifft−1 0.021* 0.006 0.020
(0.011) (0.004) (0.045)
Input Tarifft−1 -0.016* -0.057*** -0.041**
(0.010) (0.018) (0.017)
Other Industry-level controls YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES
Observations 4,472 1,572 1,813
R-squared 0.752 0.877 0.843
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The robust standard
errors are corrected by clustering variables at the 6-digit industry level. Sample is restricted to the detail
level manufacturing industries during 1972-2014. Dependent variable is industry-level markup estimations
corrected by Olley-Pakes Method. Output Tarifft−1 is 1-year lagged industry Output Tariff in log form and
Input Tarifft−1 is 1-year lagged industry input tariff in log form. Specifications (1) report regressions results
on the full sample from 1972-2014 where Input Tariff is calculated using weights based on 1972 benchmark
I-O table. Column (2) - (3) report the regression results from splited samples of 1972-1988 and 1989 - 2014.
And Input Tariff is calculated using weights based on 1972 and 1988 benchmark I-O table respectively. Other
industry-level controls include industry capital-labor ratio.
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Table 10: Alternative Markup: Profit Margin
Dependent variable: Firm Level Profit Margin
Panel A: Unweighted Regression Panel B: Weighted Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnHimpt−1 0.084 0.088 0.031 0.118
(0.053) (0.053) (0.104) (0.105)
lnVimpt−1 0.036*** 0.031*** 0.060*** 0.047***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.014)
Other Industry-level controls NO YES NO YES
Other Firm-level controls NO YES NO YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 253,833 252,580 252,047 250,746
R-squared 0.499 0.517 0.517 0.545
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The robust standard errors are corrected
by clustering variables at the firm level. Sample is restricted to the firms that appears during 1972-2014 merged with 6-digit
industry code. Dependent variable is firm-level profit margin measured by profit over sales. lnHimpt−1 is 1-year lagged industry
horizontal import penetration ratio in log form and lnVimpt−1 is 1-year lagged industry vertical import penetration ratio in log
form. Specifications (1) - (2) report unweighted regressions and specifications (3) - (4) report the regression results that uses the
number of firms that arebeing used in the production function estimation of each 2-digit industry as weight in the regressions. Other
firm-levelcontrols include the number of employees, capital-labor ratio, and average wage. Other industry-level controls include
industry capital-labor ratio.
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Table 11: Sensitivity to Outliers
Dependent variable: Industry-level Markup Firm-level Markup
Panel A: Industry Regression Panel B: Firm Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnHimpt−1 -0.846∗∗∗ -0.803∗∗∗ -0.488∗∗∗ -0.256∗∗∗
(0.321) (0.307) (0.104) (0.097)
lnVimpt−1 0.098∗∗ 0.092∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗
(0.043) (0.037) (0.014) (0.013)
Other Industry-level controls NO YES NO YES
Other Firm-level controls NO NO NO YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 11513 11467 253735 210074
R-squared 0.743 0.757 0.679 0.721
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The robust standard errors are corrected by
clustering variables at the 6-digit industry level for columns (1) and (2) and clustering at the firm level for columns (3) and (4).
Dependent variable is industry-level markup estimations corrected by Olley-Pakes Method. lnHimpt−1 is 1-year lagged industry
horizontal import penetration ratio in log form. lnVimpt−1 is 1-year lagged industry vertical import penetration ratio in log form.
Only observations that fall between the top and bottom 2.5 percentile of industry markup and firm markup are kept for column
(1)-(2) and column (3)-(4) respectively. Specifi-cations (1) - (4) report the weighted regression results that uses the number of
firms that are being used in the prod-uction function estimation of each 2-digit industry as weight in the regressions. Other firm-
levelcontrols include thenumber of employees and capital-labor ratio. Other industry-level controls include industry capital-labor
ratio.
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Table 12: A Difference-in-Difference Exercise: China’s WTO Accession
Dependent variable: Industry-level Markup
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline With Control With Trend Placebo 1999
AVHs98−00 ∗ POST2000 -0.029** -0.037** -0.013***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.000)
AV Vs98−00 ∗ POST2000 0.406** 0.413** 0.485***
(0.165) (0.202) (0.007)
AVHs97−98 ∗ POST1999 -0.062
(0.039)
AV Vs97−98 ∗ POST1999 0.678
(0.485)
Industry Trend NO NO YES NO
Industry Controls NO YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 3373 3118 3118 3118
R-squared 0.848 0.845 1.000 0.845
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The robust standard
errors are corrected by clustering variables at the 6-digit industry level. Dependent variable is industry-
level markup estimations in log form corrected by Olley-Pakes Method. AVHs98−00 and AVHs97−98 are
the average horizontal import penetration ratio from China in sector s between 1998 to 2000 and between
1997-1998 respectively. AVVs98−00 and AVVs97−98 are the average vertical import penetration ratio from
China in sector s between 1998 to 2000 and between 1997-1998 respectively. POST2000 and POST1999 are
dummy veriables which takes 1 only if year is 2000 and 1999 respectively. Industry-level controls include
industry labor, sales and fixed capital in log form.
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Figure 1: Inverse Productivity Cut-off of Importing Firms
Figure 2: Inverse Productivity Cut-off of Importing Firms: A Reduction of Trade Cost
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Figure 3: Inverse Productivity and the Firm Number
Figure 4: Inverse Productivity and the Firm Number: A Reduction of Trade Cost
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Figure 5: Import Productivity Cut-off: Constant Fixed Cost
Figure 6: Inverse Productivity and Firm Number, Endogenous Entrants
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Figure 7: The Evolution of Average Markups and Import to GDP Ratio in the US (1960 - 2014)
Figure 8: The Evolution of Average Markups and Imported Input Penetration in the US (1974
- 2014)
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Figure 9: The Change of Average Markups and the Change in Import Penetration in the US
(1980 - 2014)
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Appendix A
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Claim 1 is equivalent to the following conditions: ϕm is the unique solution to the equation
H(ϕm) ≡ [2ϕd−(V
φ+1)ϕm](1−V φ)ϕm
−
D
2
4γ − fm = 0 in the definition range
[
ϕ, ϕ
]
; H(ϕi) > 0 for
ϕi < ϕm ; and H(ϕi) < 0 for ϕi > ϕm .
The solutions to the equation H (ϕm) = 0 in the definition range ϕm ∈ R are: ϕm1 =
ϕd−
√
ϕ2
d
− 4γfm(1+Ψ)
L(1−Ψ)
1+Ψ or ϕm2 =
ϕd+
√
ϕ2
d
− 4γfm(1+Ψ)
L(1−Ψ)
1+Ψ . Moreover, when ϕ < ϕm1 or ϕ > ϕm2, then
H(ϕ) < 0; when ϕm2 ≥ ϕ ≥ ϕm1 , then H(ϕ) ≥ 0. As follows and the assumptions in propo-
sition 1, we get the following properties: (i) ϕ > 4γfm(1+Ψ)
L(1−Ψ) and ϕ <
2
1−Ψ
√
γfm
L
; (ii) ϕd ∈
[
ϕ, ϕ
]
;
(iii) 21−Ψ
√
γfm
L
>
√
4γfm(1+Ψ)
L(1−Ψ) ; (iv)
ϕd−
√
ϕ2
d
− 4γfm(1+Ψ)
L(1−Ψ)
1+Ψ decreases in ϕd ; and (v)
ϕd−
√
ϕ2
d
− 4γfm(1+Ψ)
L(1−Ψ)
1+Ψ
increases in ϕd. So we have ϕ >
√
4γfm(1+Ψ)
L(1−Ψ) −
√
4γfm(1+Ψ)
L(1−Ψ) −
4γfm(1+Ψ)
L(1−Ψ)
1+Ψ >
ϕd−
√
ϕ2
d
− 4γfm(1+Ψ)
L(1−Ψ)
1+Ψ and
ϕd+
√
ϕ2
d
− 4γfm(1+Ψ)
L(1−Ψ)
1+Ψ ≤
ϕ+
√
ϕ2− 4γfm(1+Ψ)
L(1−Ψ)
1+Ψ < ϕ. Thus, we get a unique solution ϕm =
ϕd+
√
ϕ2
d
− 4γfm(1+Ψ)
L(1−Ψ)
1+Ψ
such that H(ϕm) ≡ [2ϕd−(V
φ+1)ϕm](1−V φ)ϕm
−
D
2
4γ −fm = 0 in the definition range
[
ϕ, ϕ
]
; H(ϕi) > 0
for ϕi < ϕm ; and H(ϕi) < 0 for ϕi > ϕm.
Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2: change of ϕm, ϕd and N
Proof of ∂N
∂Ψ > 0 and
∂ϕd
∂Ψ > 0 :
Given the value of Ψ, equation (18) describes a negative relation while equation (12) shows a
positive relation between N and ϕd . (See 3) In 3, the intercept of the curves for equation (18)
and equation (12) determines the values for both N and ϕd . A decrease of Ψ will shift the curve
for equation (18) to move downwards, which leads to lower values for both
N and ϕd .
Proof of ∂ϕm
∂Ψ < 0 :
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Recall that the equation for ϕm is ϕm =
ϕd+
√
ϕ2
d
− 4γfm(1+Ψ)
L(1−Ψ)
1+Ψ =
ϕd
1+Ψ +
√
ϕ2
d
(1+Ψ)2 − 4γfmL(1−Ψ2) . If
∂ϕd
∂(1+Ψ)
1+Ψ
ϕd
< 1, then the terms ϕd1+Ψ and
ϕ2d
(1+Ψ)2 decreases in Ψ. Also, we observe that the term
− 4γfm
L(1−Ψ2) decreases in Ψ, thus
∂ϕm
∂Ψ < 0.
Q.E.D.
A.3 Derivative of equation (20)
µ¯ =
ϕm´
ϕ
k
(
ϕΨ+ϕd
2ϕΨ
)(
ϕ−ϕ
ϕd−ϕ
)k−1 (
1
ϕd−ϕ
)
dϕ+
ϕd´
ϕm
k
(
ϕ+ϕd
2ϕ
)(
ϕ−ϕ
ϕd−ϕ
)k−1 (
1
ϕd−ϕ
)
dϕ
µ¯ =
ϕm´
ϕ
(
ϕΨ+ϕd
2ϕΨ
) (
1
ϕd−ϕ
)
dϕ+
ϕd´
ϕm
(
ϕ+ϕd
2ϕ
) (
1
ϕd−ϕ
)
dϕ
µ¯ = 12(ϕd−ϕ)
[(
ϕ+ ϕdΨ lnϕ
)
|ϕmϕ + (ϕ+ ϕdlnϕ) |ϕdϕm
]
µ¯ = ϕd
2
(
ϕd − ϕ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)

1
Ψ ln
ϕm
ϕ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)
+ ln ϕd
ϕm︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3)
− 12ϕ
Q.E.D.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
As µ¯ = ϕd2(ϕd−ϕ)
(
1
Ψ ln
ϕm
ϕ
+ ln ϕd
ϕm
)
− 12ϕ, we get the following properties for partial derivatives:
∂µ¯
∂ϕd
< 0 , ∂µ¯
∂Ψ < 0, and
∂µ¯
∂ϕm
> 0 . If ∂ϕd
∂Ψ
Ψ
ϕd
< lnϕ , we have dµ¯
dΨ =
∂µ¯
∂ϕd
· ∂ϕd
∂Ψ +
∂µ¯
∂ϕm
· ∂ϕm
∂Ψ +
∂µ¯
∂Ψ < 0 ,
indicating that the trade reduction process leads to an increasing trend of the average markup.
Q.E.D.
A.5 Market Equilibrium in the Independent Fixed Sourcing Cost case
In the open economy case, the Equation (13) becomes :
P¯ =
ϕmˆ
0
(
Wϕ+ Ψ +Wϕd + 1
2
)
dG(ϕ)/G(ϕd) +
ϕdˆ
ϕm
(
Wϕ+ 2 +Wϕd
2
)
dG(ϕ)/G(ϕd) (29)
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As ϕ ∼
(
ϕ
ϕ
)k
, we can simplify the equation above as:
P¯ = Ψ− 12
(
ϕm
ϕd
)k
+ (2k + 1)W2 (k + 1) ϕd (30)
Substituting into Equation (11) we get
N = γ
η
α− ϕd
ϕd −
[
Ψ−1
2
(
ϕm
ϕd
)k
+ (2k+1)W2(k+1) ϕd
] (31)
Combining equations (23) and (31) , we get:
N = γ
η
α− ϕd
[2k(1−W )+2−W ]ϕd
2(k+1) +
1−Ψ
2
(
1
W
)k (
1− (1−Ψ2)L+4γfm2ϕd(1−Ψ)L
)k (32)
Equation 26 shows that if k is small enough, e.g. k=1, the number of survived firms N decreases
in the surviving critical value ϕd, and increases in Ψ. Similar to section 2.3.2, now equations
32 and NE = NG(ϕd) uniquely determine the inverse productivity cut-off ϕd and firm number N .
When variable trade cost V decreases, new equilibrium get to a lower level of N and ϕd , i.e.
∂ϕd
∂Ψ > 0 and
∂N
∂Ψ > 0 . In addition, if the marginal effect of cost reduction on the surviving
cut-off value is small enough such that ∂ϕd
∂Ψ <
L(1−Ψ)2+4γfm
2WL(1−Ψ)2 , the critical value for importing will
decrease in Ψ, i.e. ∂ϕm
∂Ψ > 0.
A.6 Estimation of Markup
The estimation of markup follows exactly the same method as in De Loecker et al. (2016). Here
we sketch out the basic ideas. Using the methodology in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), no
inference from demand or mkt structure. Starting with a production technology
Qit(Vit;Kit; Ωit) = Fit(Vit;Kit; )Ωit
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The associated Lagrangian function (with one composite input) is
L(Vit;Kit; Ωit) = P Vit Vit + ritKit − λit(Qit(.)−Qit)
First-Order Condition with respect to the variable input V gives
∂Qit(.)
∂Vit
Vit
Qit
≡ θVit =
1
λit
P Vit Vit
Qit
where θVit is the output elasticity of the variable input V and the Laglangian multiplier λit is
a measure of marginal cost. Rearranging the terms we have markup µit defined as price over
marginal cost
µit ≡ P
λ
= θVit
PitQit
P Vit Vit
where the output elasticity θVit is estimated from production function estimation and PitQitPVit Vit is the
inverse of input revenue share of the variable input V , which could be directly calculated from
firm-level accounting data.
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